In Search of a Biological Crux for AI Consciousness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18716/ojs/phai/2026.3037Keywords:
AI consciousness, machine consciousness, biological theories of consciousness, functionalism, substrate independence, reductionism, physicalism, dualism, identity theory, supervenience, phenomenal internalism, phenomenal externalism, Russellian monism, tracking theories, naive realism, interpretationism, neural correlates of consciousnessAbstract
Whether AI systems could be conscious is often thought to turn on whether consciousness is closely linked to biology. Roughly, the thought is: if consciousness is closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is impossible; and if consciousness is not closely linked to biology, then AI consciousness is possible—or, at any rate, it’s more likely to be possible. A clearer specification of the kind of link between consciousness and biology that is crucial for the possibility of AI consciousness would facilitate inquiry into the prospects for AI consciousness. After motivating desiderata that such a specification should meet, I argue that proposed views about the relationship between consciousness and biology tend not to capture such a crucial link. In addition, I offer a thesis that does capture the link: the biological requirement according to which being conscious at least nomically requires having biological states.
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Copyright (c) 1970 Bradford Saad

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